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The Editor's foreword Questioning the (happy) narrative of geoeconomics
Péter Marton 1 quarter of a century ago, as the tensions of the Cold War were already winding down or virtually gone in fact, Edward Luttwak's thesis (1990) predicted that states would continue to find themselves in a competitive situation in trying to secure the resources and modalities of their economic development. Luttwak explained this competition in terms of states' interest in securing the welfare of their populations through employment, the state's inherent drive to rival with other states around it and to outdo them as much as possible ("relative advantage"), bureaucracies' "urge of role preservation" connected to the latter, and domestic interest groups' pressure on governments to make them work to their advantage. This would not lead to military conflict in an age of interdependence, Luttwak argued, as it does not make sense to sink a ship carrying a cargo of export cars to beat the competition on the automobile market. In an interdependent economy one has to find other, different ways of securing advantages for one's economic agents. Regulatory means, strategic investments, and careful manoeuvring in economic diplomacy will thus be the key instruments of statecraft in the coming era. invoking a Clinton-era slogan through paraphrasal, to define its essence, concluding "It's the Geoeconomy, Stupid!" (Rashish, 2014) .
Without a comprehensive review of all that is currently the subject of discussions framed as "geopolitics," it may be interesting to ask if it is really so self-evident that TTIP and similar agreements are about geoeconomics? By what benchmark do we claim this?
What counterfactuals do we address when we claim one future is better than another?
What are the fundamental assumptions based on which we hope to understand the prospective implications of an agreement of this kind? What implications are we interested in in the first place? What implications are seriously discussed and institutionally assessed in their broader social and environmental context?
The articles in the present issue of COJOURN delve into such and other questions, and more. Mary Durfee's analysis offers a take on how the negotiations for TTIP and CETA (the Canada-Europe Trade Agreement) address, or at times and in certain respects fail to address, social and environmental implications of these agreements, using the 3 example of the Arctic as a sub-region facing diverse prospective effects stemming from these agreements. She asks if negotiations failing the standard of a truly comprehensive consideration of the consequences really qualify as "geoeconomics," i.e. if they really fit the ("happy") narrative of states creating more jobs on the basis of carefully defined collective interests? Aiken Samuel Chew Márquez' article reads as important illustration and follow-up after this, looking at the complex social context of the production of African palm oil in Guatemala and its manifold impact on local communities that are often exploited and dispossessed in the process. His assessment of how the seemingly happy constellation of jobs created for poor indigenous communities (as a superficial reading of the implications of palm oil production would have it) may lead to "ecocide" in certain cases is stark warning of the often problematic nature of "the social life of things."
Tamás Péter Baranyi's article is third in the present issue and complements it in a fundamental way: by placing the Clintonian approach to geopolitics as "engagement" (of those willing) and "enlargement" in an historical perspective, the article gives us a rich discussion of how a concept that was partly the product of policy discourse, and partly that of academia, came to define practices and shape grand strategy. Baranyi draws attention to the mixed record of the Clinton administration in this respect, along with some of the contradictions of the set of policies in question.
In the fourth article of this issue, Kálmán Mizsei discusses the way a process of multiple transition unfolded over the last decades in Ukraine and Moldova where the interaction between the West and Russia is informed lately by considerations of a "geopolitical" rather than a "geoeconomic" nature. A focal point of the analysis is the failure of fundamental governance reform in the two countries, and what the most important obstacles to it may be. The pluralistic oligarchic system seen in Ukraine at the present is clearly a challenge to Luttwak's general assumption of utility-maximising state and buraucratic actors and the primacy of domestic influences on state policy. Even more importantly perhaps, it is a key strategic challenge of world politics as well, with major ramifications for Central and Eastern Europe -and beyond.
